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Improving Lebanon’s PSSM Capacity 
By Jamie McGhee [ Mines Advisory Group, MAG ] 
Weapons and ammunition management (WAM) is a global issue in which nations are responsible for the physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) of weapons and ammunition to help mitigate weapons diversion and proliferation, and to prevent against an unplanned explosions 
at munitions sites (UEMS). Although in most instances preventable, UEMS incidents have increased, lead-
ing to significant loss of life, life-changing injuries to innocent civilians, and damage to property.¹
In ideal circumstances countries would have the money for suffi-
cient equipment and storage facilities; however, this is not always the 
case. Often the security sector is left to manage its weapons and ammu-
nition stockpiles on an extremely limited budget. This means having 
to be self-reliant to keep things running as they should, sourcing basic 
equipment such as wooden pallets to stack ammunition. While this 
is often seen as a short-term scenario, the reality is that these stop-
gaps often turn into a long-term solution or become the “norm” in 
the absence of sufficient cash or capacity to run technical refresher 
training for military personnel, replace outdated equipment, and keep 
existing storage facilities maintained. As a result, ammunition stock-
piles can deteriorate rapidly. 
The same can be said of the procurement of arms and ammuni-
tion. If states do not have a budget to purchase newer ammunition 
and phase out older stockpiles, ammunition is inevitably kept past 
its original shelf life, with insufficient technical capacity to conduct 
routine surveillance and maintenance of the ammunition through-
out its lifecycle. Through no fault of the military, ammunition is often 
housed in less than adequate storage facilities or buildings not origi-
nally designed for its storage. 
These are the defining factors in global incidents involving 
ammunition stockpiles, and it’s why the Lebanese Armed Forces 
(LAF) requested assistance to bolster its national capacity for PSSM, 
as they fully understood the dangers posed to both the military per-
sonnel working at these facilities as well as the civilian population 
living nearby. 
Global Challenges
There are always challenges when discussing WAM with any gov-
ernment, due the sensitive nature of the subject, and general reluctance 
to allow outside parties to see the true extent of the state’s deficiencies 
regarding PSSM. Every country ultimately has different needs when 
looking at both technical capacity of existing security sector personnel, 
weapons/ammunition storage, accounting practices, and management 
systems that are at different levels of compliance when looking at the 
risk reduction process levels (RRPLs) in the International Ammunition 
Technical Guidelines (IATGs).2 
International best practices are often associated with costing mil-
lions of Lebanese pounds (LBP). However, this is not necessarily the 
case, particularly at the start of any WAM pilot project. While it does 
cost money to train and provide adequate equipment for security sec-
tor personnel to conduct their duties, first understanding what the 
problems are and finding the solutions through dialogue with the 
national authorities can bring an easy resolution to what initially 
seemed a difficult problem. 
Similarly, governments often claim there are insufficient funds to 
provide better storage, train more personnel, purchase new weap-
ons and ammunition, and destroy older stockpiled ammunition. 
However, thorough risk assessments of all ammunition stockpiles and 
existing storage facilities, and estimated financial implications of a 
potential UEMS can incentivize more governments to better man-
age their weapons and ammunition stockpiles. In the case of stor-
ing explosive munitions, “risk avoidance” is impossible as the state 
already has ownership. Therefore, identifying all risks and ensuring 
they are professionally managed is critical.
The essence of risk management lies in maximizing the areas where we have some control over the  
outcome while minimizing the areas where we have absolutely no control over the outcome”.
~ Peter L. Bernstein
1
McGhee: Managing Risk Through Transparency and Cooperation
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2021
THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION126
Weapons and Ammunition Management in Lebanon
In 2017, the LAF approached the U.S. Department of State with a 
request to support PSSM activities at three of their existing ammuni-
tion storage facilities. After an initial assessment (21–22 January 2018) 
of the LAF’s PSSM practices at several locations by a US technical 
team, MAG was asked to assist LAF improve current WAM practices, 
and bring them into line with the IATGs. MAG conducted technical 
site assessments (October and December 2018) at the three locations 
and made recommendations on how to improve the overall security 
of the facilities. 
With an additional $1.6 million in continuation funding in February 
2019, MAG has since conducted PSSM technical site assessments at 
thirteen locations (three in 2018 and ten in 2020) identified by the 
LAF as high priority for possible intervention. At each location, MAG 
assessed and then prioritized storage facilities utilizing a “low cost-
high impact” model when looking at WAM interventions, i.e., MAG 
provided the correct level of intervention to meet the requirements for 
that specific location. This process often involves finding a simple, cost-
effective solution to resolve an issue and mitigate the risks identified, 
which is just as effective as a more complex high-cost intervention.
Whereas all locations are prioritized by risk probability and impact, 
several key factors must be taken into consideration when conducting 
a site assessment to ensure the correct level of intervention is identi-
fied. These can include the following
• accessibility (including visibility) of the site
• adequate fire-fighting equipment and personal protective 
equipment (PPE)
• adequate lightning protection3
• compatibility groups of the ammunition4,5
• construction design and blueprint of existing facilities6
• costs of potential rehabilitation/construction works
• estimated repair costs if UEMS take place (conducted by the 
state)
• future expansion plans of facility (if applicable)
• hazard class of the ammunition7
• hazard division of the ammunition8,9 
• location of facility
• net explosive quantity (NEQ) of ammunition being stored on 
site for calculating quantity distances (QDs)10
• number of personnel living/working at the base
• number of trained ammunition technical staff
• quantity and types/nature of ammunition stored
• secondary hazards or critical infrastructure near storage facili-
ties (fuel stations, gas pipelines, underground services, hospi-
tals, ministries, schools, power stations, religious buildings, etc.)
• security of area in which ammunition depot is situated
• value of ammunition stocks stored
While this list isn’t exhaustive, it highlights the need to gather sig-
nificant data to ascertain the appropriate intervention level required to 
ensure the safety and security of both the ammunition stockpiles and 
the civilian population living near the potential explosion site (PES).11 
In December 2020, MAG completed construction work at three of 
the thirteen locations previously identified as a priority by the LAF. 
The level of intervention at each of the storage facilities at the locations 
varied in scale and complexity, and involved MAG providing technical 
training—an IATG familiarization workshop to introduce the IATGs 
and international best practices to forty-seven existing LAF ammuni-
tion technical personnel from the Ammunition Directorate who will 
be managing the ammunition at the three locations where these tech-
nical interventions were conducted. Additional refresher training for 
LAF personnel was planned in 2020, but due to COVID-19 restrictions 
in Lebanon this was not possible. 
Due to land constraints and the encroachment of the civilian popu-
lation to existing ammunition storage facilities in country, the pro-
vision of QD training to the LAF was seen as critical. This training 
familiarized staff with online tools that (1) can help determine what 
can safely be stored at all ammunition storage facilities in country and 
(2) assist them with risk mitigation as part of the long-term planning 
for the Ammunition Directorate. 
As a result of the training, a plan is underway to destroy donor-gifted 
ammunition that cannot be used by the LAF, which will provide much 
needed space inside the storage facilities, in turn reducing the risk to 
both military and civilian personnel living nearby. A joint assessment 
of the LAF central demolition site was also conducted on 17 September 
2020 to check the location’s suitability for future ammunition destruc-
tion operations by LAF explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams.
This QD training also allowed the Ammunition Directorate to start 
planning logistical movements of larger caliber ammunition to more 
suitable locations outside of populated areas. The QD training showed 
MAG History in Lebanon
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) currently has operations in twenty-six countries globally, and nineteen of those countries have a 
WAM program. Operational in Lebanon since 2001, MAG began by conducting mine clearance operations and mine risk educa-
tion (MRE). Lebanon has endured several decades of both civil and external conflicts that have left the country with an exten-
sive legacy of landmine and cluster munition contamination. In total, MAG Lebanon has cleared more than 18 million sq m of 
contaminated land and removed or destroyed more than 62,000 landmines, cluster munitions, and other unexploded ordnance 
(UXO). Since 2017, MAG has deployed teams on the Blue Line (the border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel as defined 
by the United Nations on 7 June 2000). In this time, MAG has cleared and released an area of more than 400,000 sq m and found 
and destroyed more than 29,000 items including anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines, and explosive remnants of war (ERW). In 
October 2018, MAG expanded operations in the northeast of Lebanon and has since conducted non-technical survey (NTS) and 
clearance activities; releasing over 786,000 sq m of suspected and contaminated hazardous land.
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the LAF the minimum safety distances needed for each site based on 
the NEQ of explosives being stored. With this knowledge they were able 
to identify the amount of ammunition that had to be either moved from 
the location to somewhere more suitable or marked for destruction if it 
was (1) surplus to operational requirements or (2) if there was a lack of 
sufficient storage space to house it securely and safely. 
Image 1 and 2. Storage of projectile propellant before (left) and after (right) intervention by MAG.
All images courtesy of MAG.
One of the biggest challenges for the LAF is availability of suitable 
land for construction of military bases and larger ammunition storage 
facilities. A large proportion of existing military infrastructure was 
purpose built by France in the 1950s. Although a lot of this infrastruc-
ture remains and is still functional, facilities previously isolated with 
excellent safety distances are now located in highly populated areas. 
At the end of the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990), plots of land were 
quickly snapped up by civilians and used to build houses, shops, etc. 
Building developments continue to expand and now encroach close to 
existing ammunition depots, meaning they are at risk should an UEMS 
take place. As the minimum safety distance in the IATGs for storing 
explosives is 400 m, the LAF has thought innovatively about how to 
Current Challenges in Lebanon
reduce the risk at these sites, while mitigating the threat posed to the 
civilian population. In light of this, the Ammunition Directorate, 
who are responsible for all in-country ammunition, has managed sig-
nificant logistical movements of ammunition stocks throughout the 
country to reduce the threat to civilians while still maintaining LAF 
operational effectiveness.
As part of the LAF long-term strategic planning, MAG is in reg-
ular contact with the LAF’s G3 Director of Planning Department 
and G4 Logistics regarding available governmental land, and dis-
cussions continue to identify suitable areas pending technical field 
assessments for the construction of large-scale ammunition depots 
and sub-unit depots.
LAF Response to the Beirut Port Explosion
On 4 August 2020, a warehouse in the Port of Beirut containing 
2,750 metric tonnes of ammonium nitrate (confiscated off a cargo ship 
in 2013 for failure to pay port fees and stored with commercial fire-
works and other chemicals) caught fire, causing the ammonium nitrate 
to detonate.12 The subsequent explosion caused severe damage to civil-
ian homes, key military and civilian installations, and infrastructure 
in the vicinity of the port.
The incident itself left at least 218 people dead, 7,000 people injured, 
300,000 displaced, and most of the country’s grain supplies destroyed; 
the overall cost of the blast is estimated at $10–15 billion.13 The politi-
cal fallout from the explosion was almost immediate, resulting in 
widespread rioting and significant increases in major security inci-
dents across the country. Through increased pressure by the public, 
MAG completed the full-scale construction of a new purpose-
built ammunition storage area (ASA) in December 2020 that has four 
explosive storehouses to secure the LAF’s more valuable, larger caliber 
munitions at a strategically important location. The facility meets all 
requirements within the IATGs. 
it eventually led to the collapse of the Lebanese government and 
resulted in several senior members of the port customs and immigra-
tion going to jail for their failures leading up to the event.
While this event was not related to either weapons or ammuni-
tion, the devastation the blast caused highlighted the need for the 
LAF higher command to seriously look at existing LAF ammunition 
storage facilities and start working towards removing all ammunition 
stockpiles outside of populated areas.
Following the explosion, on 4 August 2020, LAF G4 Logistics 
requested MAG’s assistance to conduct post-blast assessments of sev-
eral military facilities near the port that suffered heavy blast damage 
and resulted in LAF personnel being killed and injured. MAG, sup-
ported by LAF military engineers, made emergency security repairs at 
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these military installations and received additional emergency funds 
from the US government to conduct this work.
The LAF G4 and the Ammunition Directorate were tasked with 
moving all unserviceable ammunition identified during the site assess-
ments by MAG and ammunition previously earmarked for destruction 
by the LAF to various holding locations ready for destruction, pending 
final approval from LAF higher command.
The General Commander of the LAF ordered the Ammunition 
Directorate to deploy immediately and conduct risk assessments of all 
military facilities to ensure all known risks were being managed cor-
rectly and report back on any new risks identified or non-conformities. 
Next Steps 
MAG Lebanon14 has secured an additional $3.5 million from the 
U.S. Department of State and will assist the LAF with the development 
of the strategic plan, which is seen as essential for the LAF to ensure 
its fit for purpose. Moreover, MAG will continue to foster its relation-
ship with the LAF and assist both in the development of its personnel’s 
technical skills and with improving existing standard operating pro-
cedures to ensure compliance with the IATGs. 
MAG will also provide additional WAM technical training to a 
further forty-five LAF personnel and provide munition safety plan-
ning (MSP) workshops to higher levels of the Lebanese military to 
ensure everyone is aware of their roles and responsibilities regarding 
the safety and security of the national ammunition stockpiles and the 
citizens of Lebanon. In addition to the capacity development of LAF 
personnel, technical field assessments will also be conducted at thirty 
locations identified by the LAF. These locations are still being deter-
mined as part of the strategic planning discussions.
Technical interventions at six locations previously assessed by MAG 
have also been agreed by LAF and approved by the donor. These inter-
ventions range in complexity from improving basic security measures 
to the complete construction of a new purpose-built ammunition stor-
age facility. When completed, this will be a significant improvement 
to both the LAF’s existing technical capacity and overall capability 
to securely store their ammunition stockpiles. All planned activities 
mentioned will be completed by January 2023.
LAF are the de facto entity when it comes to having the trust of the 
civilian population, who look to the LAF to maintain security, conduct 
damage assessments of all buildings impacted by the blast, and deliver 
food aid packs to all households affected by the blast. Not only did they 
manage the situation, the LAF has accelerated all planned ammunition 
destruction operations, and discussions are taking place between LAF 
and MAG regarding upgrading the existing central demolition site 
assessed in September 2020 to allow for larger ammunition destruc-
tion operations to take place.
Jamie McGhee
WAM Technical Manager
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
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While there is still a long way to go in achieving the required stan-
dards, current progress can be attributed to the LAF’s proactive nature 
and transparency at all levels with MAG. The WAM program in 
Lebanon has already made significant progress in this regard, and the 
author would like to personally thank the donor and all members of 
the LAF with whom MAG is working for, helping these vital PSSM 
interventions to take place. 
Image 3 and 4. (Left) One of the external roller shutter access doors to the ammunition depot. (Right) A large ammunition 
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